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THE LAST BASTION CRUMBLES:
ALL PROPERTY RESTRICTIONS ON THE
FRANCHISE ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
New Mexico has long imposed property qualifications on the right
of its citizens to vote in elections called by the subdivisions of the
State to obtain authorizations for the issuance of general obligation
bonds. 1 Early in 1970 New Mexico's legislature found itself faced
with a dilemma concerning these restrictions on the franchise. A
three-judge United States District Court in our neighboring state of
Arizona had just declared similar voter qualifications unconstitutional and the case was pending review by the United States Supreme
Court.2 Meanwhile, what was to be done in local bond elections in
New Mexico? The legislature sought a means of ensuring the validity
of these elections regardless of the final outcome of the Arizona case.
The legislature did, of course, have the power to do away with
New Mexico's statutory restrictions of the franchise to property
taxpayers, but that would have left still standing the provisions in
New Mexico's constitution, which cannot be amended by the legislature alone.' In early February, it attempted to resolve this problem
by passing the Bond Election Act.4 But the provisions of this act,
while appearing to remove the property restrictions from the franchise, actually retain them almost in full force. The purpose of this
Comment is to show why the Bond Election Act, admittedly an
emergency measure, is itself unconstitutional and cannot stand as the
law of New Mexico.
I
States or their subdivisions may no longer make the ownership of
property and/or payment of taxes a prerequisite to the right to vote
in any election. This is the practical outcome of several recent United
States Supreme Court decisions. It is predictable that quite a few real
property owners, who have traditionally enjoyed the exclusive voice
on the issuance of local bonds, at least those to be serviced by ad
valorem property taxes, will be resentful and alarmed to discover
1. See N.M. Const., Art. IX, § § 10, 11 and 12, for such restrictions as applying to
county, school district, and municipal indebtedness.
2. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
3. N.M. Const., Art. XIX, § 1 provides that amendments to the constitution may be
proposed in either house of the legislature, but even after each house separately approves
the proposed amendment by the vote of the majority of all members elected to that house
(not just the majority of those voting), it must still be ratified by the electors of the state.
4. N.M. Laws 1970, ch. 6.
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that this last remaining prerogative of the landed must now be shared

with the have-nots.

5
The decision in City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, handed down on
June 23, 1970, marked the effective end of real property ownership

and/or payment of property taxes as a qualification for the right to
vote in any election; but it is doubtful that Phoenix would have
come up for decision, or that it would have been decided as it was,
but for the holdings in Kramer v. Union Free School DistrictNo. 156
7
and Cipriano v. City of Houma, both decided on June 16, 1969. In

Kramer and Cipriano the Court for the first time extended to
statutory franchise classifications based on property ownership the
standard of closest scrutiny established in Reynolds v. Sims. 8
Fourteen states, including New Mexico, still imposed property
and/or tax-paying qualifications on the franchise in local bond elec9
tions when City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski came before the Court.
New Mexico's constitution limited the franchise on questions of
county indebtedness to qualified electors of the county who also
1
paid property taxes in the county in the preceding year. 0 A similar
restriction was placed on the franchise in municipal elections on
questions of debt.' ' School district indebtedness was subject to the
approval of owners of real estate within the school district after a
1933 amendment adding the property requirement. 2 The remaining
thirteen states varied in their descriptions of this elite electorate,
none but Rhode Island allowing for substitution of personal property

for real estate,' 3 most insisting on actual payment of taxes and one
5. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
6. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
7. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
8. 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
9. Alaska (Alaska Stat. § 07.30.010(b) (Supp. 1969)); Arizona (Ariz. Const., Art. 7,
§ 13, Art. 9, § 8); Colorado (Colo. Const., Art. XI, § § 6, 7 and 8); Florida (Fla. Const.,
Art. 7, § 12, F.S.A.); Idaho (Idaho Code Ann. § 31-1905 (1963), § 33-404 (Supp. 1969),
§ 50-1026 (1967)); Louisiana (La. Const., Art. 14, § 14(a) and (in)); Michigan (Mich.
Const., Art. II, § 6); Montana (Mont. Const., Art. IX, § 2, Art. XIII, § § 2, 5 and 6; Mont.
Rev. Codes Ann. § 11:2310 (1968), § 75:3912 (1962)); New York (N.Y. Town Law § 84
(McKinney 1965); N.Y. Village Law § 4-402 (McKinney 1966)); Oklahoma (Okla. Const.,
Art. X, § 27); Rhode Island (R.I. Const. amend. 29, § 2); Texas (Tex. Const., Art. 6, § § 3
and 3a, Vernon's Ann. St.); Utah (Utah Const., Art. XIV, § 3).
10. N.M. Const., Art. IX, § 10.
11. Id. § 12.
12. Id. § 11.
13. R.I. Const. amend. 29, § 2 provides that "no person shall be allowed to vote upon
any proposition to impose a tax or for the expenditure of money in any town... unless
he ... shall either (1) be really and truly possessed in his own right of real estate in such
town of the value of one hundred thirty-four dollars... which qualifies no other person to
vote.. . or (2) shall within the year next preceding have paid a tax assessed upon his
personal property in said town of the value of at least one hundred thirty-four dollars."
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even weighting the votes by the amount of property owned.' 4 State
constitutional and statutory provisions requiring the approval of
property owners and/or taxpayers on questions of local debt did not
apply to revenue bonds in many states.' s A few, however, included
all local forms of debt.' 6
New Mexico's constitution is not specific in what constitutes
"debt" within the terms embraced by its provisions requiring that
such questions be submitted to the vote of local property owners or
property taxpayers.' 7 But the New Mexico supreme court ruled in
1933 that "debt" as used in these provisions contemplates only obligations entitling "the creditor unconditionally to receive from the
debtor a sum of money, which the debtor is under a legal, equitable,
or moral duty to pay without regard to any further contingency."' 8
It therefore held that revenue bonds did not fall within this definition since repayment was pledged only from the revenues derived
14. La. Const., Art. 14, § 14(a) provides that "subdivisions of the State, may incur debt
and issue negotiable bonds, when authorized by a vote of the majority in numbers and
amount, of the property taxpayers qualified to vote." (emphasis added)
15. Many states have cases holding that revenue bonds are not included by their
provisions requiring a referendum on questions of debt, since revenue bonds are not comprehended as "debt" in the sense of a general obligation of the issuing authority. See, e.g.,
Humphrey v. City of Phoenix, 55 Ariz. 374, 102 P.2d 82 (1940); Searle v. Haxtun, 84 Colo.
494, 271 P. 629 (1928); State ex. rel. Capitol Addition Bldg. Commission v. Connelly, 39
N.M. 312, 46 P.2d 1097; Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321, 279 P. 878 (1929). Cf State v.
City of St. Petersburg, 145 Fla. 206, 198 So. 837 (1941) where certain revenue bonds, while
not being ruled out as "debt," were nonetheless exempted from Florida's provisions
requiring referendums on debt because of there "being no additional tax burden undertaken." But see Feil v. Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643 (1912) where the court held
that by undertaking to maintain utility rates sufficient to service the revenue bonds in
question, a debt was created and a referendum required. However, curiously, even in those
states holding revenue bonds not to be embraced by the term "debt" and therefore not
subject to their provisions requiring referendums on questions of indebtedness, property
qualifications specified by the same provisions were imposed when revenue bond elections
were held, in the absence of specific provisions to the contrary for revenue bond elections.
A few of the states did pass Revenue Bond Acts which provided that voting in revenue bond
elections should be open to all qualified voters in the subdivision seeking to issue the bonds.
See Idaho Code Ann. § § 50-1027 to 50-1042 (1967); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § § 141.101
to 139 (1967); N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 14-30-1 to 11 (Repl. 1968).
16. See La. Const., Art. 14, § 14(m) which states that the franchise in revenue bond
elections is limited to property taxpayers. Cf City of Richmond v. Allred, 123 Tex. 365, 71
S.W. 2d 233 (1934) where the Attorney General was held to be justified in refusing to
approve the issuance of revenue bonds where the transcript failed to show that only electors
owning taxable property in Richmond had been allowed to vote on the question, as required
by the Texas constitution in elections to determine the "expenditure of money," even
though revenue bonds did not create debt. However, the decision in Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969), which held property qualifications on the franchise unconstitutional in revenue bond elections, had made moot any questions as to the constitutionality of Louisiana's and Texas's voting restrictions on revenue bonds.
17. N.M. Const., Art. IX, § § 10-12.
18. Seward v. Bowers, 37 N.M. 385, 386, 24 P.2d 253 (1933).
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from the operations of the utility and the creditor could not look to
any other source for payment of the bonds."9 New Mexico's
supreme court in 1935 was again confronted with the question of
what "debts" were meant to be included in the provisions in Article
2
9 of its state constitution requiring referendums on debts. 0 It was
held that since the provisions in question all limited the amount of
debt allowed by a percentage of the assessed valuation of property
subject to taxation, the framers of the New Mexico constitution
must have conceived that said assessment bore some relationship to
the debt ...(and) that such assessment roll and the property there
listed would be resorted to from year to year by the general taxing
power as the source of funds for repayment of the debt so
created. 2'
The court concluded that "debt" as used in Article 9 was meant to
comprehend only obligations that pledge for their repayment "the
general faith and credit of the ... municipality, . . . and contemplating the levy of a general property tax as the source of funds with
2
which to retire the same." "2 The issue in these cases, however, was
not whether the vote on questions of local debt could be limited to
property owners and/or taxpayers but whether local governments
ever had the power to issue revenue bonds without a referendum on
the question. Where the statutes required that the question of the
2
issuance of revenue bonds be submitted to the voters, 3 the franchise was limited on this question to property taxpayers until
1965.24
2s
decided June 16, 1969, therefore
Cipriano v. City of Houma,
had no direct effect on New Mexicans. Here the Court declared
unconstitutional a Louisiana statute limiting the franchise to property taxpayers in an election held to approve the issuance of
municipal utility revenue bonds.
The holding in Cipriano marked the first inroad on the right of
19. Id.
20. State ex rel. Capitol Addition Bldg. Commission v. Connelly, 39 N.M. 312, 46 P.2d
1097 (1935).
21. Id. at 320, 46 P.2d at 1101.
22. Id. at 318, 46 P.2d at 1101.
23. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-30-4 (Repl. 1968), amending N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-39-10
(1953). Both old and new laws specified that a municipality could not issue revenue bonds
approved by a majority, but less than three-fourths, of its governing body without a
referendum on the question.
24. See former N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-39-10 (1953) which specified that only property
taxpayers vote in revenue bond elections. See also N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-30-4 (Repl. 1968)
which removes this restriction by providing that such questions be submitted to all qualified
electors of the municipality.
25. 395 U.S. 701.
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states to use property qualifications to deny the vote to otherwise
qualified voters on questions of local indebtedness. It was founded
on the principles first clearly delineated in Kramer v. Union Free
School District No. 15,2 6 decided the same day. In Kramer a
bachelor living with his parents successfully challenged the constitutionality of a New York statute which limited the franchise in certain
school district elections to those otherwise qualified voters who were
also either property owners, lessees, or parents of children in the
district's public schools.2 7 The Court agreed that such qualifications
included many persons having only a remote and indirect interest in
school affairs while excluding others having a distinct and direct
interest.2 8 It therefore held the statute to be in violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and thus unconstitutional. 2" In arriving at this decision the Court applied the
criteria established in two other recent cases involving challenges of
the constitutionality of franchise restrictions imposed by states.
In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind
the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and
3
the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification. 0
[S] ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any
alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully
and meticulously scrutinized. 3
The Court added that
[a] ny unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate
in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines
32
the legitimacy of representative government.
After indicating that statutes which limit the franchise to selected
residents always run the risk of excluding voters who have substantial
interests involved, the Court set forth the criterion, only hinted at in
previous cases, by which such restrictions are to be judged:
[I] f a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona
fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the fran26.
27.
28.
29.

395 U.S. 621.
N.Y. Educ. Law § 2012 (McKinney 1969).
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
Id. at 633.

30. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
31. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
32. Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).
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chise to others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are
3
necessary to promote a compelling state interest 3 (emphasis added)

When the Court in Cipriano34 applied this yardstick along with
another from Kramer, "whether all those (otherwise qualified voters)
excluded are in fact substantially less interested or affected than
those the statute includes,'' 3 it found that the Louisiana statute in
question failed to pass either test. The revenue bonds were to be
financed entirely from the operations of municipal utilities. It is
obviously unfair to restrict the franchise to property taxpayers on a
question affecting indiscriminately all utility users and rate payers,
where no discernible extra burden is to be placed on property owners
as a class. The Court concurred in holding the statute unconstitutional, but with some difference of opinion as to the grounds for this
determination. The per curiam opinion reflected the view of five
members of the Court that the challenged provision violated the
equal protection clause. 3 6 Two concurring justices felt that the
voting classification in question was wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective, while Mr. Justice Harlan concurred,
feeling himself bound by prior decisions of the Court, despite his
view that the equal protection clause does not extend to state
political systems.3
The ink was scarcely dry on the Kramer and Cipriano decisions
when a new case arose that would persuade the Court to decide the
ultimate question of whether restriction of the franchise to property
owners is constitutional in any election. City of Phoenix v.
Kolodziejski3 I was a suit to challenge the validity of an election
conducted on June 10, 1969, in Phoenix. The election had been
called to authorize the issuance of general obligation bonds, as well
as revenue bonds, in which, pursuant to Arizona constitutional and
statutory provision, only qualified voters who were also real property
taxpayers were allowed to vote. 3 9 Appellant Kolodziejski, a nonproperty owner who was otherwise qualified to vote in Phoenix, filed
her complaint in the United States District Court of Arizona. She
questioned the constitutionality of Arizona's restrictions on the franchise in bond elections and attacked the legality of the election in
33. Id. at 627.

34. 395 U.S. 701.
35. 395 U.S. at 632.
36. Cipriano, 395 U.S. at 706.
37. Id. at 707.

38. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).

39. Ariz. Const., Art. 7, § 13, Art. 9, § 8; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § § 9-523, 35-452,
§ 35-455 (1956, Supp. 1969).
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which all the proposed bond issues were approved by a majority of
those voting in the election. 4 Phoenix conceded that, under the
decisions reached in Cipriano and Kramer, the election was invalid
with respect to the revenue bonds in question, since the Court had
held in Cipriano that its ruling applied to all revenue bond issues not
final as of June 16, 1969. The three-judge District Court discerned
no significant difference between revenue bonds and general obligation bonds. It therefore declared Arizona's property restriction
unconstitutional under Cipriano and Kramer and the whole election
invalid. Phoenix was enjoined from taking further action to issue the
bonds approved in the June 10 election, from which judgment
Phoenix appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court.4 1
In Cipriano the Court did not reach the question presented by
Phoenix: "Does the Federal Constitution permit a State to restrict to
real property taxpayers the vote in elections to approve the issuance
of general obligation bonds?" 4 2 In Cipriano the special interest
deemed necessary by the Court to justify restrictions on the franchise was obviously missing. It was clear that the revenue bonds
imposed no special burden on property taxpayers. The case for upholding such qualifications on the franchise in local bond elections
was much stronger, however, in Phoenix, where general obligation
bonds to be serviced by property taxes were at issue.
The City of Phoenix offered essentially two arguments in support
of its contention that such a classification of voters was not arbitrary
but only reasonable and just and therefore not in violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. First, it
pointed to the Arizona statute directing that property taxes be levied
to service such obligations, which places a direct burden on property
taxpayers for the benefit of the whole community. In the second
place, unlike revenue bonds, which are financed from the operations
of specific facilities used indiscriminately by both property and nonproperty owners, general obligation bonds are secured by the general
taxing power of the issuing authority. Appellee noted that since most
local governments must rely for the greater part on ad valorem taxes
to service these debts, general obligation bonds are in effect a lien on
the taxable real property in the community. Those without real
property can remove themselves and their assets from the reach of
the local taxing authority, leaving an unavoidable tax burden on the
less mobile real property owners. Therefore, Arizona's property restriction on the franchise in local bond elections serves the com40. 399 U.S. 204, --- , 90 S.Ct. at 1992-93.
41. Id. 90 S.Ct. at 1993.
42. Id. 90 S.Ct. at 1992.
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pelling state interest of protecting its land owners from unjustified,
exorbitant tax burdens imposed by non-property owners who wish
to benefit without contributing to the cost themselves. 4 '
The persuasiveness of these traditional views was evinced by the
fact that three of the eight justices hearing the case still thought
them controlling. But for the first time in history, the arguments
against such property restrictions were given a serious hearing by the
Court, and they prevailed.
In brief, appellant made her case as follows. Firstly, all citizens,
property and non-property owners alike, have a vital interest in the
public facilities and services of the community where they reside and
all will therefore be substantially affected by the outcome of local
bond elections. 4 4
Furthermore, she contended, despite the Arizona statute prescribing that after issuance of such bonds property taxes shall be
levied to service them, local governments are not restricted to this
source of revenue for the financing of their general obligation bonds.
In fact, during the past fiscal year over half of Phoenix's debt service
funds were furnished from other sources contributed to by all
residents.4 Finally, since landlords treat property taxes as just another business expense, they pass on to their tenants, if possible, any increased
tax expenses in just the same way as any other added cost, in the
form of higher rents. In addition, property taxes on commercial
property are also treated as business expenses and as such will be
reflected in the prices of goods and services in the community, which
are paid by all residents, not just property owners. Therefore, as
non-property owners ultimately share even the burden of property
taxes with property owners, there seems to be no justification whatever for denying them the vote in any local bond election.4 6
As previously stated, the Supreme Court for the first time put the
case supporting the franchise of non-property owners on the scales of
justice and found it weightier than the case of the property owners.
The age-old property restrictions are without merit. Non-property
owners are not substantially less interested in the outcome of local
bond elections than are property owners.4 7 The franchise restrictions at issue are not justified by any compelling state interest and
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

90 S.Ct. at 1993.
90 S.Ct. at 1994.
90 S.Ct. at 1994-95.
90 S.Ct. at 1995-96.
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are therefore in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.' 8
In its opinion the Court further noted that the thirty-six states
without property restrictions on voting have apparently suffered no
adverse effects on property values or local financing. Therefore, in
the absence of any showing of unique problems in those fourteen
states still restricting the vote by such requirements, the Court found
no adequate justification for their limiting the franchise to property
owners even in general obligation bond elections. 4
Phoenix v.. Kolodziejski did not present the best conceivable case
for retention of property qualifications for voting in local bond elections. The Court, however, recognized the states' need for certainty
about the scope of application of the Phoenix decision. It therefore
anticipated and forestalled future hearings on the same issue by
hypothesizing a case advancing the strongest possible argument in
support of such franchise restrictions. Even where a municipality,
unlike Phoenix, looked only to property tax revenues for servicing
general obligation bonds, the Court declared that justification for
confining the franchise to property owners would be inadequate."0
Finally, the Court ruled, as it had in Cipriano on revenue bonds,
that this decision would apply only to those authorizations for general revenue bonds (1) which were not final or where the election to
approve such bonds was constitutionally challenged, and (2) where
no bonds have been issued as of June 23, 1970.s'
II

The dilemma facing New Mexico's legislature in early 1970 was
obvious. The constitution of the State specifically limits the franchise to property taxpayers5 2 or owners of real estate' ' in the subdivision of the State seeking authorization for a bond issue. Such
provisions are also reflected in New Mexico's statutes. 4 The "Bond
Election Act ' '5
referred to earlier seemed to ensure that local
governments could hold valid bond elections during the interim while
final decision was pending in Phoenix.
This act purports to extend the franchise to all registered voters of
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. 90 S.Ct. at 1996.
Id.
Id. 90 S.Ct. at 1994-95.
Id. 90 S.Ct. at 1996-97.
N.M. Const., Art. IX, § § 10 and 12.
Id. at § 11.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 15-49-11 and 14-29-2, 3, 5 and 6.
N.M. Laws 1970, ch. 6.
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a locality in local bond elections. In actual fact, it does nothing of

the sort, because of its provisions for dividing voters into two classes:
those qualified to vote under Article 9 of the state constitution (i.e.,
property owners or taxpayers) and other qualified electors.' 6 Not
only does the act provide for separate ballots for each class to "be

cast, counted, returned and canvassed separately," ' ' but the vote of
each class is given a different weight.' s Thus, if the vote of property
owners or taxpayers is in favor of the bond issue, and if the total
vote cast in the election approves the proposition, the bonds may be
issued. But if the vote of property owners or taxpayers alone is
against the issuance of the bonds, they cannot be issued even if the
total vote favors the proposition. In short, all that non-property
owners and taxpayers have been granted by the act is a limited veto

power! It is limited because the total vote case in the election must
oppose the issuance of the bonds, not just that of non-property
owners and taxpayers. What the New Mexico legislature has done, in
other words, is to let non-property owners and taxpayers vote in
local bond elections, but not to allow their votes to be counted.
Perhaps the classification of voters in the Bond Election Act was
justified at the time the act was passed. The legislature was faced
with the dilemma of how to design voter qualifications for local
bond elections which would be valid under New Mexico's constitu56. Id. at § 4.
A. Each proposition to issue bonds shall be submitted to the following classes of
electors:
(1) the registered electors who meet the qualifications of the applicable
section of Article 9 of the Constitution of New Mexico and of relevant provisions of statutes; and
(2) all other registered qualified electors of the city, town, village, school
district, county, junior college district, or branch community college district
proposing the issue.
57. Id. at § 4.
D. Votes by each class of electors shall be cast, counted, returned and canvassed
separately so that it may be determined arithmetically:
(1) the aggregate number of votes cast at the election for and against each
bond proposition by the electors specified by the applicable section of Article
9 of the Constitution of New Mexico or as prescribed by the applicable
statutes; and
(2) the aggregate number of votes cast at the election for and against each
bond proposition by all other qualified electors.
58. Id. at § 4.
E. Any bond proposition submitted under the Bond Election Act is approved and the
bonds may be issued if:
(1) a majority of the votes cast by the electors qualified under the
applicable section of Article 9 of the Constitution of New Mexico or the
applicable statutes is in favor of the proposition; and
(2) the total number of all votes cast in favor of the proposition is more
than the total number of all votes cast against the proposition.
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tion regardless of the Court's decision in Phoenix. This was the stated
purpose of the act.' 9 That the act favored the New Mexico constitution over the holding in Phoenix is also understandable. The decision
in Phoenix was in doubt, whereas the New Mexico constitution was
quite definite. If Phoenix had been reversed, an election held under
the Bond Election Act, if challenged, could still be validated simply
by discarding the votes of the second class. 6 0 Yet in an Albuquerque
school bond election conducted on September 10, 1970, after
Phoenix had been affirmed by the Court, the provisions of the act
were still followed to the letter. Separate ballots were issued to property and non-property owners and they were tallied separately and
given unequal weight, as provided for in the Bond Election Act.6 1
Why were these provisions of the act complied with after the unconstitutionality of New Mexico's property restrictions was beyond
doubt?
New Mexico's property qualifications on the franchise and her
obvious desire to retain them are both traceable to the same
source-i.e., the age-old fears of the consequences of giving nonproperty owners the vote. The restriction of the franchise to property owners in all elections was almost universal in the American
Colonies, having been brought to our shores by English settlers. At
59. Id. at § 3, § § B. The purpose of the Bond Election Act is to permit the authorization and issuance of bonds during and after the period of uncertainty by requiring an
election procedure which will conform with any determination made by the courts as to the
validity of qualifications of electors.
60. Albuquerque held a general obligation bond election following the provisions of the
Bond Election Act on April 7, 1970, while final decision was pending on Phoenix. The
results of the election show that property taxpayers have little to fear from non-property
taxpayers. Of the eleven bond issues submitted for voter approval, none was much affected
by the non-property taxpayer vote. In a few cases the total vote in favor was raised by as
much as two percent. Non-property taxpayer voting followed that of the property taxpayers
quite closely in all respects. Since non-property owners constituted only 10% of all voters in
the election, they could not have changed the result on any question presented even if they
had all voted one way. The results would seem to indicate that a certain percentage of
property taxpayers (about 24%) can be counted upon to oppose any bond issues, no matter
how much needed, but the non-property taxpayers appeared to have a similar, if somewhat
smaller, percentage (about 15%) of voters also adamantly opposed. The small group of
non-property taxpayers apparently favoring all bond issues does not begin to offset the large
body that seems determined to vote against any municipal bond financing.
61. The total number of ballots cast in this election was 10,517, of which eighteen were
voided and not counted. The results were as follows:
Against
Total
% of Total Vote
For
6552
2918
9470
90.2
Property owners
9.8
1029
869
160
Non-property owners
7421
3078
10,499
Although a high percentage of the small non-property owner vote favored the bond issue,
one must also note the practice of some schools of sending notices of such elections home
to parents whose children might be affected by the bond issue.
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the time of the first settlements in the New World, such qualifications were already of ancient vintage in England, as is indicated by a
statute of Henry VI (1429), restricting the county suffrage to
40-shilling freeholders.6 2 While some Colonies did first impose such
restrictions on the franchise in answer to a royal mandate that electors should be "men of competent estates," 6 3 it would be a gross
misrepresentation to suggest that they were thrust upon the Colonies
in opposition to popular wishes. The colonists retained as part of
their inheritance from their motherland firm belief in "the concept
that the freeholders were and should remain the backbone of state
they were the repository of virtues not found in
and society because
64
classes."
other
The fears and justifications expressed by these early property
owners, so similar to those still heard today, can be reduced to three
basic contentions. First, there existed the feeling that poor men were
easily corruptible, that their votes would be vulnerable to bribery
and coercion. Thus Sir William Blackstone wrote that the "true
reason of requiring any qualification with regard to property in
voters is to exclude such persons as are in6 so mean a situation as to
be esteemed to have no will of their own." 5
Another justification for denying the vote to non-property owners
commonly expressed in Colonial times, but still strongly supported
by many today, was that those who pay should have the say as a
matter of right. "Implicit ...in English suffrage theory was the

belief, as old as the emergence of the House of Commons itself, that
so long as the landowners directly paid the bulk of public taxes it
was not inequitable or unjust to confine Commons' elections to
them." 6"6 American opinion reflected that of Britain. In 1775 a
Pennsylvanian declared, "A Civil Society or State is a number of
proprietors of land within certain limits, united by compact or
persons to
mutual agreement, for making laws and appointing
6
benefit."
common
their
for
laws
these
execute
There were also many, then as now, who were alarmed by
thoughts of mobile non-property owners impressing great tax
burdens on the landed without having any corresponding obligation
to contribute their share. This fear is well expressed in a letter from
eighteenth-century property owners in New Jersey to the King pro62. J. Wigmore, The Australian Ballot System as Embodied in the Legislation of Various
Countries 10 (1889).
63. See C. Bishop, History of Elections in the American Colonies 72 (1893).
64. C. Williamson, American Suffrage from Property to Democracy 3 (1960).
65. Id.at 11 quoting from W. Blackstone, 1 Commentaries 171.
66. Id. at 5-6.
67. Id. at 6 quoting from P. Force, 2 American Archives 962 (4th Series, 1837-1853).
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testing the allowance of a money qualification in lieu of a freehold
for electors. "For certainly," they petitioned the Crown,
those persons are fittest to be intrusted with choosing and being
Legislators who have a fixed valuable and permanent interest in
Lands, and must stand and fall with their country; but money is an
uncertain Interest and if it be admitted a qualification equal to
Land, an assembly may be packed of Strangers and Beggars who will
have little regard to the Good of the Country from whence they can
remove at Pleasure and may oppress the Landed Man with heavy
Taxes. 68
Perhaps those New Jersey landowners of Colonial times were
justified in their alarm for quite a different reason from the ones
advanced in their petition. As the practice of allowing a personal
estate to be substituted for a freehold as a voting qualification
became ever more widespread,6 9 it appears to have lent support to
the doubts of a growing number of thinking men about the necessity
for any property restrictions on the franchise at all. Thus Thomas
Paine is said to have supported the abolition of property qualifications on the vote with this story:
You require that a man shall have sixty dollars' worth of property, or he shall not vote. Very well, take an illustration. Here is a
man who today owns a jackass, and the jackass is worth sixty
dollars. Today the man is a voter and goes to the polls and deposits
his vote. Tomorrow the jackass dies. The next day the man comes to
vote without his jackass and he cannot vote at all. Now tell me,
which was the voter, the man or the jackass? 70
Commonsense arguments such as Paine's were coupled with increasing pressures from those disenfranchised by property qualifications and the rapidly spreading view that such qualifications were out
of place in a republic of free men. This latter view was perhaps never
better expressed than by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist:
Who are to be the electors of the Federal Representatives? Not
the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the
ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than
the humble sons of obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors
are to be the great body of the People of the United States. 7
68. Bishop, supra note 63, at 79-80 quotingfrom A. Learning and J. Spicer, The Grants,
Concessions and Original Constitutions of the Province of New Jersey. The Acts Passed
During the Proprietary Governments 658 (1758).
69. Id. at 69-82.
70. J. Bums and J. Peltason, Government by the People 251-52 (1952).
71. The Federalist No. 56, at 397 (H. Dawson ed. 1891).
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The combination of these assorted forces succeeded in virtually
eliminating property restrictions on the franchise by the middle of
the nineteenth century in America72 except in one area-i.e., elections on matters involving local indebtedness. It is true that many
states imposed the payment of poll taxes, a property qualification of
sorts, on the right to vote after the passage of the Civil War amendments. However, the twenty-fourth amendment, ratified in 1964,
provided that the right to vote in primary and general federal elections could not be conditional upon the payment of poll taxes or
other taxes. While this amendment did not specifically eliminate the
payment of poll taxes as a prerequisite to voting in state elections, it
helped pave the way for the Court's 1966 decision in Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections," in which it declared Virginia's poll tax
unconstitutional. In Harper the Court concluded "that a State
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee
an electoral standard."'7 Thus, after the Harper decision, it does not
seem unnatural that the one remaining stronghold of property qualifications on the franchise, i.e., in local elections on questions of
indebtedness, should also come under attack and collapse.
When the historical arguments in support of property restrictions
are reviewed, it is difficult to see how any of them, no matter how
valid it may have been at one time, could provide sufficient justification for retention of such qualifications today. The first contention
that the poor were so ignorant as to be overly vulnerable to bribery
and coercion obviously cannot be supported today. We not only have
almost universal literacy in this country, but the right of states to
impose fair and impartially administered literacy tests as a qualification on the franchise has been upheld in recent decisions."7 Furthermore, the secret ballot serves so effectively to thwart any attempts
by those who might try to buy the vote that such election practices,
common at one time, are virtually unheard of today.
The arguments that only those who pay the taxes should have a
72. See R. Carr, D. Morrison, M. Bernstein and R. Snyder, American Democracy in
Theory and Practice 151 (1951).
73. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
74. Id. at 666.
75. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 52 (1959);
State of South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 333 (1966). Note that while the
literacy tests in question in these and other recent cases have been found to be unconstitutional, such decisions were based on the unfairness of the tests and their discriminatory
application to minority group voters. The Court made quite clear in these decisions that
literacy tests are not in themselves contrary to the fifteenth amendment. However, they
may not "be employed to perpetuate that discrimination which the Fifteenth Amendment
was designed to uproot." 360 U.S. at 53.
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say as to their expenditure and that mobile non-property owners
should not be allowed to force heavy taxes on the landed without
any corresponding obligation to pay their share, while perhaps supportable in the past, certainly fail to carry much weight now.
Nobody escapes payment of taxes today! This is most especially true
of most local and state taxes, which, by their regressive nature, not
only fall on the entire community, but are most felt by those least
able to pay. In addition, any taxes that the non-property owner does
not pay directly, he will more than likely pay indirectly, so he
cannot even escape from them.
These considerations, among others, have convinced the Court, in
recent years, of the unfairness of property restrictions on the
franchise, and have buttressed its decisions that find them in violation of the equal protection clause. The Court has also been quick to
recognize and frustrate attempts to circumvent the effects of its
rulings.
III
New Mexico's Bond Election Act represents just such an evasion
of the Phoenix decision. The application of its provisions in Albuquerque's school bond election in the fall of 1970 cannot be justified,
since the constitutionality of New Mexico's property restrictions on
the franchise was no longer in doubt. Therefore, Albuquerque should
have issued but one ballot for all voters. The validity of the election,
if it had done so, could not then have been successfully attacked.
However, in deciding instead to follow all the provisions of the Bond
Election Act, Albuquerque did leave the door open for successful
challenge of the results of the election.
The classification of voters created by the Bond Election Act is
clearly in violation of the equal protection clause as it is construed
by the Court today. Such a classification may at one time have been
acceptable, but the New Mexico legislature must take cognizance of
the Court's current interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. In
1966 the Court said,
[T] he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory
of a particular era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally
discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of
equality, any more than we have restricted due process to a fixed
catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of
fundamental rights. Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change. 7 6
The Court now recognizes that the right to vote has two aspects,
76. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
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both of which are safeguarded by the equal protection clause. First
there is the right to vote as an incident of citizenship without regard
to sex, race or property. The Court in 1964 noted, "It has been
repeatedly recognized that all qualified voters have a constitutionally
protected right to vote.... and to have their votes counted"; 7" and
in another case, it declared, "Other rights, even the most basic, are
illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no
room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges
this right." 7"8 In 1965 the Court added that " '[f] encing out' from
the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may
vote is consitutionally impermissible." 7" The Court has never held
that classification of voters is unconstitutional, per se. But the
criteria by which a classification of voters will be judged in determining whether it is in violation of the equal protection clause have
never been more clearly laid out than in recent decisions. In 1968 the
Court stated:
'[I] nvidious' distinctions cannot be enacted without a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. In determining whether or not a state
law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the facts
and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State
claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification. 8 0
When these criteria are applied to New Mexico's Bond Election
Act it seems that (1) behind the Act are the State's constitutional
provisions plus the legislature's desire to cling to those provisions as
long as possible, (2) the interest the State claims to be protecting is
the validity of bond elections pending final decision in Phoenix, and
(3) the interest of those disadvantaged by the classification is that
they are, in effect, still deprived of any voice in bond elections.
Further guidelines have been established by the Court, however, to
aid in determining the constitutionality of a state's classification of
voters. "[T] he classifications," it has said, "must be tailored so that
the exclusion of appellant and members of his class is necessary to
achieve the articulated state goal."' '
The "articulated state goal" of the New Mexico legislature was "to
permit the authorization and issuance of bonds during and after the
period of uncertainty" as to the constitutionality of New Mexico's
77. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964).
78.
79.
80.
81.

Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964).
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
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constitutional restrictions on the franchise. 8 2 That "period of uncertainty" ended with the Court's affirming of Phoenix. So why were
the discriminatory provisions of the Bond Election Act still resorted
to in Albuquerque's school bond election? If the Court had reversed
the district court's decision, would non-property owners have been
admitted to the polls as the Act provided?
Even if one concludes that the provisions of the Act were necessary to achieve the articulated state goal, there is a further test
delineated in Kramer:
[I] f the exclusions are necessary to promote the articulated state
by
interest, we must then determine whether the interest promoted
83
limiting the franchise constitutes a compelling state interest
If the interest that New Mexico's legislature claimed to be protecting was a compelling state interest, it is difficult to understand why
the proposed amendments to the state constitution submitted to the
voters on November 3, 1970, did not include one to eliminate the
property qualifications on the franchise contained in Article 9. The
conclusion seems inescapable that the interest being protected is not
the articulated one of resolving doubt during a period of uncertainty
but is rather the retention of unconstitutional restrictions. This does
not qualify as a compelling state interest. "Voter qualifications have
no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other
tax." 8 4 (emphasis added).
But even assuming for the moment that the classification of voters
imposed by the Bond Election Act could satisfy the above requirements, there still remains the second aspect of the right to vote
protected by the equal protection clause, that is, the right to have
one's vote counted equally with those of others cast in the same
election. Thus, in 1963, the Court stated that "once the class of
voters is chosen and their qualifications specified, we see no constitutional way by which equality of voting power may be
evaded.""s And in 1964 the Court expanded on this theme by
adding that "the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by
wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise." 8 6
The New Mexico legislature chose to deny non-property owners
the franchise in local bond elections by this means. It cannot be
82. See note 59 supra.

83. 395 U.S. 621, 632 note 14 (1969).
84. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 633, 666 (1966).
85. Grey v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
86. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
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seriously contended that votes from both classes have equal weight
under the provisions of the Bond Election Act. Non-property owners
have only an illusory vote. It is true that when the principle of one
man-one vote was first enunciated by the Court, it was deciding
cases which alleged discrimination in elections for political office.8 1
However, the principle is equally applicable to any election. Recently
it has even been used to hold unconstitutional state requirements of
a greater than majority vote for the approval of local bond issues.8 8
And its application to the Bond Election Act could have only one
result.
But it is not simply the unequal weight given the vote of each class
of electors that renders the Act unconstitutional. The classification
of the voters is quite enough in itself. Since the issuing authority has
complete discretion in issuing any bonds approved in a referendum,
the approval of non-property owners could (and probably would) be
ignored if property taxpayers voted the issue down. Therefore the
classification of voters is in itself an "invidious" distinction violating
the equal protection clause.
These questions regarding the validity of the provisions of the
Bond Election Act have left local authorities in doubt as to how
bond elections may be conducted without risk of successful challenge. But the New Mexico supreme court has thus far failed to
remove the uncertainty. In fact, it has just ruled on a case in which it
avoided deciding the only genuine issue, which was the validity of
87. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Grey v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
170 S.E.2d 783 (1969), cert. granted sub
W. Va. --88. Lance v. Bd. of Educ., --nom., Gordon v. Lance, 397 U.S. 1020 (No. 1244, 1969 Term; renumbered No. 96,
1970 Term). Accord, Rimarcik v. Johansen, 310 F.Supp. 61 (D.C. Minn. 1970), petition for
cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3007 (U.S. May 5, 1970) (No. 1530, 1969 Term; renumbered No.
147, 1970 Term), where the challenged statutory provision required a 55% affinnative vote
for the adoption of a home rule charter amendment. The court in this case relied in good
part on the decision of New Mexico's supreme court in State ex. rel. Witt v. State Canvassing
Board, 78 N.M. 682, 437 P.2d 143 (1968). In Witt the court held unconstitutional a state
constitutional provision which required the amendments of the constitution proposed by
the legislature be ratified by a vote of the people of the state in an election at which "at
least three-fourths of the electors voting in the whole state, and at least two-thirds of those
voting in each county in the state, shall vote for such amendment." N.M. Const., Art. XIX,
§ 1. The case arose from such an election where the proposed amendment received 81.2%
approving votes statewide but in one county less than half of the voters favored it, and in
twelve counties it failed to receive the necessary two-thirds vote. The New Mexico supreme
court held that the "one person-one vote" principle established in earlier cases, see, e.g.,
note 87 supra was controlling in this case also. The court declared the requirement of a
two-thirds favorable vote in each county was in violation of the equal protection clause.
This appears to be the first case to extend the "one person-one vote" rule to elections other
than those held to elect representatives to government. The court did not consider the
validty of the requirement that three-fourths of the statewide vote must favor the proposed
amendment since that question was moot, the total vote favoring the amendment having
been well over 75%.
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the dual ballot box and the weighted voting provisions of the Bond
Election Act.8 9 The case arose when New Mexico's attorney general
refused to approve the election certificate submitted by the Board of
Education of the Village of Cimarron for ratification of the results of
its school bond election held September 29, 1970. Cimarron had
allowed all registered voters, whether property owners or not, in the
Cimarron school district to vote on a $97,000 school bond issue,
approved 122-47, using a single ballot box.9 0 The attorney general
based his refusal on Cimarron's failure to conform with the Bond
Election Act's requirements of dual ballot boxes and a showing that
the majority of real property owners voting in the election approved
the bond issue.9 '
The Cimarron Board of Education applied directly to the New
Mexico supreme court for a writ of mandamus to compel the attorney general to perform his duty of approving the bond issue. The
court issued an alternative writ to Attorney General Maloney, ordering him to approve the bond transcript or to show cause why he
should not do so. 9 2
The attorney general's brief alleged that the duty of the attorney
general to uphold New Mexico's constitution and laws precludes his
sanctioning of an election conducted with disregard to express provisions of the New Mexico constitution and the Bond Election
Act. 9 3 But the attorney general had already authorized Albuquerque's school bond issue, approved in an election held in conformity
with the provisions of the Bond Election Act but not restricted to
owners of real estate as required by the constitution of New
Mexico. 9 4 From this it seems quite clear that the invalidity of the
constitution's restriction had been recognized by the attorney general and was not really at issue.
On the other hand, the court acknowledged its long established
precedent which precludes the challenging of school bond election
results on other than constitutional grounds, after the statutory time
set for such challenges has passed, as it had in this case. In 1940 the
court stated:
We now hold that, where power resides in school districts to borrow
money and issue bonds therefor at all, these statutory provisions,
after the time limited, protect the proceedings against attack for
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Bd. of Educ. of Cimarron v. Maloney, No. 9160 (N.M. Dec. 7, 1970).
Albuquerque Journal, Nov. 22, 1970, § F, at 8, col. 1.
Bd. of Educ. of Cimarron v. Maloney, No. 9160 (N.M. Dec. 7, 1970).
Id.
Albuquerque Journal, Nov. 22, 1970, § F, at 8, col. 1.
Albuquerque school bond election of Sept. 10, 1970, supra note 61.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1

invalidity as well as for irregularity, except upon constitutional
grounds. 9 s
Therefore, the court, while recognizing that the attorney general's
refusal to certify the election certificate was founded solely on
Cimarron's failure to comply with provisions of the Bond Election
Act, nevertheless managed to find the constitution's restriction of
the franchise to property owners, despite the prior admission by the
attorney general of its invalidity, to be the real issue in dispute. The
opinion thus stated that the attorney general
refused to approve the legality of the bond issue for the reason that
there was no showing that a majority of the then owners of real
estate within the school district had voted in favor of creating the
general obligation bond debt as required by Art. IX, § 11, New
Mexico Constitution, and because the election was not conducted
with dual ballot boxes as provided for by § 11-6-38 [N.M. Laws
1970, ch. 6].
The issue before us is that part of Art. IX, § 11, Constitution of
New Mexico, which provides inter alia that: "... . only when the
proposition to create the debt has been submitted to a vote of such
qualified electors of the district as are owners of real estate within
the school district and a majority of those voting on the question
96
have voted in favor of creating such debt..." (emphasis added)
It is interesting to note how the court, by ingenious transposition
of phrases, endeavors to embody § 4-E(1) of the Bond Election Act
in Art. IX, § 11 of the New Mexico constitution.9 ' Having by this
means determined the issue to be the validity of the restriction on
the franchise of the New Mexico constitution, the court reluctantly
admitted its invalidity by appropriating a portion of the recent
opinion of Utah's supreme court on the same question. New
Mexico's supreme court stated:
This court is totally in agreement with the statement contained in
the Utah case, supra, as follows:
"Notwithstanding our emphatic disagreement with the majority in
the Phoenix case we realize that it is for the present to be recognized
as the law; and that as such it renders those aspects of Section 3 of
95. Taos County Bd. of Educ. v. Sedillo, 44 N.M. 300, 305, 101 P.2d 1027, 1031
(1940); accord Bd. of Educ. of Gallup v. Robinson, 57 N.M. 445, 449, 259 P.2d 1028, 1031
(1953); Bd. of Educ. of Aztec v. Hartley, 74 N.M. 469,471, 394 P.2d 985, 987 (1964).
96. Bd. of Educ. of Cimarron v. Maloney, No. 9160 (N.M. Dec. 7, 1970).
97. The Bond Election Act provides that bonds may be issued if (1) a majority of the
votes cast by the electors qualified under the applicable section of Article 9 of the Constitution of New Mexico or the applicable statutes is in favor of the proposition, N.M. Laws
1970, ch. 6, § 4-E (1).
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Article XIV of our State Constitution, and Sections 11-14-2 and 5,
U.C.A. 1953, [New Mexico Constitution Art. IX, § 11] inoperable
insofar as they require that only property taxpayers [real property
owners] be permitted to vote in such bond elections. We further
observe that this should have no effect whatsoever in nullifying or
limiting any other aspects of those provisions of the law. In other
words, it is our opinion that the aspect of these provisions just
referred to as having been rendered inoperable, are severable from
the other aspects of the aforesaid provisions of our State Constitution and statutes, so that bond elections
may be held and bonds may
98
be issued..." (emphasis added)
At first glance it might appear that the court has refrained from
expressing any views as to the validity of the Bond Election Act's
provisions. However, close scrutiny reveals that this is scarcely the
case. Note that after the Utah provisions cited by Utah's court as
being all those affected by the decision, both constitutional and
statutory, New Mexico's court inserted a corresponding New Mexico
citation, presumably as complete as that of the Utah court. New
Mexico's only statutory property restrictions on the franchise are
those contained in the Bond Election Act. The omission of the Bond
Election Act from the New Mexico citation would therefore seem to
indicate that the court deems it valid even after Phoenix. This view is
strengthened by the court's assertion that all other aspects of the
relevant provisions of the state's constitution and statutes are severable and operable. Further weight is added to this interpretation of
the court's opinion by its declaration that it stands "totally in agreement" with the quoted decision. If this is a true representation of the
current views of the court on the provisions of the Bond Election
Act, we hope that it may reconsider those views in light of the
arguments offered in this Comment.
IV
In the words of Justice Harlan, "Property ...qualifications, very
simply, are not in accord with current egalitarian notions of how a
modern democracy should be organized." 9 9 New Mexico must
amend its laws to conform with contemporary views of equal protection. Evasions are futile and meaningless. The justification for
property restrictions on the franchise, if once valid, are valid no
longer. In our society the burden of taxation is shouldered by all.
Simple justice demands that those who share in the burden should
98. Bd. of Educ. of Cimarron v. Maloney, No. 9160 (N.M. Dec. 7, 1970), citing Cypert v.
Washington County School Dist., --- Utah --- , 473 P.2d 887 (1970).
99. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 686 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
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also enjoy the accompanying privileges. Perhaps the greatest of these
privileges is the right to have a voice in our government. Nor is this a
revolutionary new concept. At the Constitutional Convention on
August 7, 1787, consideration of Article IV, § 1 ' 0 of the proposed
constitution was taken up. Govurneur Morris of Pennsylvania
"moved to strike out the last member of the section beginning with
the words 'qualifications of [the] Electors,' in order that some other
provision might be substituted which wd. restrain the right of sufDuring the debate which followed,
frage to freeholders."' 1
although Morris's proposal received some support, it was strongly
opposed by many of the delegates. The views of the majority, who
eventually defeated the proposed change by a vote of seven to
one, 0 2 were probably best expressed by Col. George Mason of
Virginia:
We all feel too strongly the remains of ancient prejudices, and
view things too much through a British medium. A Freehold is the
qualification in England, & hence it is imagined to be the only
proper one. The true idea .. . [is] that every man having evidence of

attachment to & permanent common interest with the Society ought
to share in all its rights & privileges. [Is] this qualification restrained
to freeholders? Does no other kind of property but land evidence a
common interest in the proprietor? does nothing besides property
mark a permanent attachment[?] Ought the merchant, the monied
man, the parent of a number of children whose fortunes are to be
pursued in his own Country, to be viewed as suspicious characters,

and unworthy to be trusted with the common rights of their fellow
Citizens[?] 103
Dorothy B. Wagar

100. The members of the House of Representatives shall be chosen every second year, by
the people of the several States comprehended within this Union. The qualifications of the
electors shall be the same, from time to time, as those of the electors in the several States, of
the most numerous branch of their own legislatures.
J. Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, at 386 (1966).
101. Id. at 401.
102. Id. at 405, note 51, which reports that one state favored Morris's proposed change,
seven voted against it, one was divided on the matter, and one was not present. No mention
is made of the vote of the thirteenth state.
103. Id. at 403.

